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ABSTRACT
Decapitation operation has existed for a long time in military history; however, it was not
until March 2003 'decapitation attack' became a well known term in the mass media. This paper
is based on the connotation of decapitation based on historical study and refines the term into
military strategic concept of decapitation strategy. Ideas derived from detailed studies on
Lanchester-type combat models are used to describe the effectiveness of conventional regular
forces under decapitation warfare, which includes asymmetric, nonlinear, stand-off and special
operation forces (SOF) operations. A conceptual model is presented to describe the effects of
the decapitation strategy on the regular battlefield. With extensive coverage of operational factors
such as robustness of forces, time difference between combats, undermining effects, breakpoints,
attrition rates, total force level and force allocation, the model is suitable to analyse complex
scenario with different types of military operations consisting of decapitation strategy. An
illustrative example is provided to demonstrate the application of the model. The conceptual
model is built based on hypotheses, assumptions, and criteria. In the absence of historical data,
no data analysis and parameter estimation are involved.
Keywords: Decapitation, Lanchester, square law, combat fire effectiveness, decapitation attack,
decapitation strategy, military strategy, decapitation warfare combat models, military operations
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NOMENCLATURE
Ab(Ar) Blue (Red) regular army force strength
Db(Dr) Blue (Red) garrison (decapitation)
force strength
K Ab(K Ar) Blue (Red) regular army attrition-
rate coefficient
K Db(K Dr) Blue (Red) garrison (decapitation)
force attrition-rate coefficient
m(n) Fraction of Blue (Red) regular army
which is affected by the undermining
operation and decapitation combat
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p (q ) Undermining effect factor of Blue
(Red) regular army
0 0
( )b rDb Dr
b r
D Df f
D D Surviving portion of Blue garrison
(Red decapitation) force and subscript
'0' denotes the initial condition.
DEFINITIONS
Decapitation Strategy: It is the strategy adopted by
the attacker with the intention to weaken or degrade
the combat potential of the defender by means
of undermining operation and ground combat.
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Undermining Operation: It is the military operation
other than ground combat, including kidnapping
or assassination of key leaders (the so called
Political Decapitation), sabotage, precision strike,
air bombardment, missile attack, etc. with the
purpose to undermine the military ability of the
target country.
Political Decapitation: It is the annihilation by
physical elimination of part or all of the key
governmental players of a country1.
Ground Combat: It consists of decapitation and
regular combat; the purpose of the former is
to seize the capital of the target country and
through the seizure to degrade the combat
effectiveness of the defender's regular forces;
the latter is to defeat the defender's entire
regular army.
Decapitation Combat: It is the combat in which
the attacker's decapitation troops fight the defender's
capital guarding garrison forces.
Regular Combat: It is the combat in which the
attacker's regular forces clamp and fight the
defender's regular army.
1 . INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the US-led coalition forces defeated
Iraq with superior military technology. During the
first phase of the operation, decapitation attack
became a highly visible military term in the mass
media. The attempt of the operation phase may be
told from the speech of US President G.W. Bush
given on the night of March 19, 2003: "…, coalition
forces have begun striking selected targets of military
importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability
to wage war." Decapitation strategy is different
from 'confronts the tough with toughness' way of
war fighting; but rather it is a combination of precision
blitzkrieg, nonlinear, asymmetric, stand-off and air-
land-sea-space operations.
During the decapitation operation on Iraq, the
coalition forces with overwhelming technology superiority
not only widen the gap between allied and Iraqi
forces but also minimise allied losses2. Moreover,
from historical military observations it is noted that
assassination attempt is part of the decapitation
operation3, even the core of it1.
Decapitation operation itself is not a new type
of warfare, according to Serge Walder1 and Hyder's4
historical review; there have been eight political
decapitations operations in addition to 9/11 attack
and wars against Afghanistan and Iraq since 1901,
as shown in Table 1. Walder1 also argued that
political decapitation is the most cost-effective way
to languish, remove, and reshape a regime.
Similarly, decapitation strategy can be used in
other scenario. Across the pacific, some military
analysts warn of an eminent crisis across the Taiwan
Strait5,6. They assume that PRC (People's Republic
of China) might adopt Decapitation Strategy to
disable command and control system, to sabotage
key military facilities and sites in order to capture
Taipei -- ROC's (Republic of China) Capital and
occupy the country.
Successful implementations of decapitation strategy
will soft-up7 the military strength of the adversary.
From the military point of view, Decapitation Strategy
may consist of two operations, undermining and
ground combat, which could be in sequence or
overlapped. To minimize the casualties and costs,
the undermining operation of the offensive is to
degrade the combat effectiveness of the defender,
as shown in Fig.1. The ground combat is divided
into decapitation combat and regular combat.
The model focuses on the regular combat and
attempts to illustrate the effects of undermining
operation and decapitation combat on the regular
forces' combat effectiveness.
Figure 2 shows the systematic diagram of the
model; 'Effect 1' is the effect of undermining operation
on decapitation combat which is integrated into the
'Effect 2', the effect of decapitation combat on the
regular combat.
The purpose of the research is to provide a
mathematical tool to aid military conceptual analysis
and evaluation. The process of model building is
based on given hypotheses, assumptions, model
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criteria and scenario. There is no data analysis
and parameter estimation involved by now.
2 . LANCHESTER-TYPE COMBAT MODELS
It has been 90 years since Lanchesterian combat
model was first developed. The model is widely
used not only in military field but also in electoral
and commercial fields8. Lanchester-type models
are divided into two branches which are deterministic
and stochastic. The former uses the mean to model
competition phenomenon; the latter focuses on the
random characteristic of competition, and these
both complement each other9. Each branch can be
Degrade 
Combat 
Potential
Political Decapitation
Special Forces Operation
Precision Strike
Missile Attack
Disrupt Political Structure
Disable C2I
Cause Psychological Chaos
Undermining Operation
Clamp the Regular Army
Smash the Garrison
Capture the Capital
Occupy Targeted Country
Ground Combat
Decapitation Strategy
Defeat Regular Army
Figure 1.  Decapitation strategy.
Time Target Attacker Defender Operation type 
1901# Emilio Aguinaldo US Philippines Unconventional war 
1916# Francisco Pancho villa US Mexico Multiple missions 
1943# Admiral 
Isoroku Yamamoto 
US Japan Single mission in world war II 
1956.10* Ben Bella French Algerian Single mission 
1973.09* Allende US (CIA) Chile Coup 
1979.12* Amin Soviet Russia Afghanistan War
 
1989.12*# Noriega US Panama War
Operation Just Cause 
1993# Pablo Escobar US and Colombia Drug Dealer Multiple missions by Colombia authorities 
2001.09* World Trade Center Al Qaeda US Terrorist attack 
2001.10* Osama bin Laden US Afghanistan War
2003.03* Saddam Hussein US Aillied Iraq War
* Serge Walder1,  # Victor D. Hyder4 
Table 1. Decapitation operations in history
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divided into two types, homogeneous and heterogeneous
forces, based on the levels of resolution. Some of
the deterministic-homogeneous Lanchester-type combat
models are listed in Table 2.
Except well known laws based on different
attrition processes, such as square law, linear law,
mixed law, logarithmic law, etc.10, tremendous efforts
have been made to bring the combat model more
realistic and more applicable. Among all the efforts
made, some of these focus on combat effectiveness;
for example, Helmbold11 modified Lanchester's equations
with fire-effectiveness-modification factor and unified
square, linear and logarithmic laws as shown in
Eqn (1).
dx x
a t y h
dt y
dy yb t x h
dt x
                       
(1)
Taylor10 integrated survivors' effectiveness with
the function of breakpoint and losses, along with
the existence of permanently ineffective fraction
of force, fI,X, fI,Y into the form of Eqn (2).
0
,
0
0
,
0
1 1
1 1
v
I Y
BP
u
I X
BP
y ydx
a f y
dt y y
x xdy b f x
dt x x
(2)
in which, u and v are force casualty-degradation
parameters.
Equations (1) and (2) show that ineffectiveness
does exist and it is caused by the inefficiencies of
force scale, attrition or permanently ineffective
portion of force. This paper attempts to extend the
discussions on effectiveness to decapitation strategy
and build conceptual mathematical model to describe
the degrading course of fire effectiveness on a
regular battlefield.
3. MODELLING BASES
3.1 Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1: The undermining operation has effects
on both sides regarding regular combat.
Hypotheses 2: The course of decapitation combat has
influence on both sides regarding regular combat.
War with Decapitation Strategy
Ground Combat Operation
Undermining Operation
(Degrade Combat Potential )
Decapitation Combat
(Seize the Capital )
Regular Combat
(Defeat the Regular Army )
Ef
f e
ct
 
3
Effect
 1
Effec
t 2
Figure 2. Systematic diagram of decapitation strategy.
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3.2 Criteria of Model
The conceptual model should be able to describe
the following contents
Criterion 1: The effects of undermining operation
on regular combat;
Criterion 2: The influence of decapitation combat
on regular combat;
3.3 Assumptions
Assumption 1: The effects of undermining operation
on the decapitation combat are integrated to
the attrition-rate coefficients already.
Assumption 2: Both of the battlefields follow Helmbold
Lanchesterian model11, which is similar to
Eqn (3)15. Other Lanchester laws might be
applied to the modelling concept
Type Defender Attacker Remarks 
Aimed fire10,15 ay
dt
dx
 
bx
dt
dy )()( 220220 yyaxxb
Area fire10,15 axy
dt
dx bxy
dt
dy )()( 00 yyaxxb
Ambush10 ay
dt
dx bxy
dt
dy )()(
2 0
22
0 yyaxx
b
Operational losses10 ax
dt
dx by
dt
dy
y
y
a
x
xb 00 lnln
Early stage of small unit engagement 
Fire support10 xay
dt
dx ybx
dt
dy
supporting fire not subject of attrition 
Fire effectiveness10,15 
y
xhyta
dt
dx )( 
x
yhxtb
dt
dy )( h: inefficiencies of scale9 
Historical attrition law12,13,14 C D Gdx e x ydt
F G Ddx
e x y
dt
 
D, G: universal constants 
C, F: varied coefficients 
Attrition and break point10,15 
y
yy
yyfa
dt
dx
BP
Y
I )1)(1(
0
0
x
xx
xxfb
dt
dy
BP
X
I )1)(1(
0
0 I
f , ,BP BPx y : the inherent ineffective 
fraction and break-point of x, y 
dx
ay X
dt
dy bx Y
dtReinforcement15 dx
ay cx X
dt
dy bx dy Y
dt
X, Y: reinforcements rate 
Range dependent kill-rate10 y
r
r
a
dt
dx )1(0 x
r
rb
dt
dy )1(0
Attrition rate coefficients and 
range (Mobile attack)10,15 y
rr
tk
dt
dx
a )
v
( 0 xrrrrtk
dt
dy
b )
vv
( 0
, ; ,r r : maximum effective 
range of weapons; range dependence 
parameters 0 , vr : opening range of 
battle, attack speed 
Vulnerable area10,14 
Small arm xyA
a
dt
dx
X
VY X xy
A
a
dt
dy
Y
VX Y
Large lethality xyA
a
dt
dx
X
LY Y
xy
A
a
dt
dy
Y
LX X
, , ,V Lv a a A : fire-rate, vulnerable 
area, lethal area and presented area 
Guerrilla warfare10,15 ytadt
dx )( xyebebdt
dy tt ])1([ 21 : shift rate from area fire to aimed 
fire 
i. Force-on-force attrition modelling, 198010 
ii. Warfare modeling, 199513 
iii. Military operation research, 199714 
iv. Mathematical methods on defense analysis, 200015 
Table 2.  Some deterministic-homogeneous Lanchester-type attrition models
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Assumption 3: The course of decapitation combat
is expressed by the attrition of decapitation
troops and garrison forces.
Assumption 4: The information regarding the losses
of troops on decapitation battlefield will be transmitted
to both sides on regular battlefield freely.
C D G
F G D
dx
e x y
dt
dy
e x y
dt
                          
(3)
3.4 Scenario
To occupy the target country Blue, the attacker
Red seizes air and naval superiority and launches
forces entry into target country by air landing,
dropping and amphibious operation following undermining
operation as part of its decapitation strategy. The
purpose of the landed forces is to execute two
missions: The decapitation troops (D
r
) is to defeat
the capital garrison forces (Db) and to seize the
capital while the regular troops (A
r
) are to clamp
the Blue's regular forces (Ab) from rushing to rescue
the capital, and then to defeat the regular forces
following the capturing of the capital.
The decapitation and regular battlefield are of
conventional military combat; the war is terminated
when the combat potential of one side on the regular
battlefield is eliminated.
4. MODEL BUILDING
Considering that the combat power of a given
unit equipped with specific weapons is transformed
from combat potential, traditionally, the combat power
is derived directly from combat potential and is
treated as the same17. The homogeneous Lanchester
model describes combat potential with force strength
and attrition-rate coefficient. The former integrates
units, arms of services, and types of weapon systems
into an aggregated number; the latter is the inherent
capability of decreasing the antagonistic force strength.
When several operations or battlefields are treated
isolated or independently and there are no connections/
influences among/between them, the situation could
be illustrated as in Fig. 3, square law as explanatory
example.
With decapitation strategy, the transformation
efficiency of combat potential to combat power is
determined by the proposed decapitation effect
multiplier which integrates the effects of undermining
operation and decapitation combat on regular forces'
combat potential. Once the decapitation effect exists,
the efficiency of the combat power transformation
will be degraded; that is, only portion of the combat
potential will be transformed to combat power and
cause attrition to the opposing forces. The modelling
concept is shown in Fig. 4, also square law is taken
as example.
Based on the modelling concept and assumption
2, the decapitation warfare model for regular combat
is given in Eqn (4).
Undermine
Undermine
Db
Dr
KAbAb KArAr
Combat 
Potential
KDrKDb
Combat 
Power
×Mr
×Mb
Decapitation 
Operations
Combat 
Potential
Combat 
Power
Figure 4. Decapitation effects on regular combat.
KAb b b KDr KAr r
r
Db Dr
KDb
KDr
Ab Ar
KAb
KAr
dD
Figure 3.  Independent battlefields.
r
Db b
dD K D
dt
b
Dr r
dD K D
dt
r
Ab b
dA K A
dt
b
Ar r
dA K A
dt
rb
Ab
Ar
rb
Db
Dr
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C D Gb
r b r
F G Dr
b b r
dA
M e A A
dt
dA
M e A A
dt
                 
(4)
4.1 Decapitation Effect Multiplier
Basically, the multipliers are designed to integrate
effects caused by decapitation strategy-undermining,
capital decapitation-and robustness of the regular
forces themselves. Eqn (5) gives the proposed
form of the multipliers.
1 11 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
Db
Dr
fp
b
q f
r
M m m e e
M n n e e (5)
The exponential terms inside the square brackets
represent the effects caused by the undermining
and capital combat; details will be discussed in the
following paragraphs. The overall mathematical
behaviour of Eqn (5) is described as follows:
1. The multipliers are symmetrical, that is when
m=n, p=q, and fDb=fDr then Mb=Mr.
2. 0 m (n) acts as a weight between 1 and
terms inside the square brackets.
3. Since p(q) 1 and 0 fDb(fDr) 1, square bracketed
terms are 1.
4. The values of the multipliers, 0 Mb(Mr) 1.
5. When p(q)=1 means there is no undermining
operation against Blue (Red).
6. When fDb=fDr=1, means there is no capital
decapitation or capital combat not initiated yet.
4.2 Weight or Robustness: Parameters m,n
Given the scale of undermining operation (which
might be measured with air raid sorties, rounds of
precision bombs, number of ballistic/cruise missiles,
etc.) or attrition level of capital combat, it is suggested
that no unit suffers exactly the same inefficiency
of combat power transformation. The decline of
efficiency of combat power transformation changes
from nation to nation, service to service, forces to
forces, even unit to unit.
Reasons that cause such differences in transforming
efficiency could be training, organisation, doctrines,
technology, will to win, etc. The proposed model
refers such differences as robustness of the regular
forces, the more robust the unit is the less decline
in combat power transformation efficiency. And
the robustness could be referred as weight,
mathematically.
When the robustness is extremely low, m(n) =
1, the transformation efficiency is totally determined
by the square bracketed terms in Eqn (5). On the
other hand, if the robustness is extremely high, m(n) = 0,
the combat potential is completely transformed to
combat power, regardless of the scale of undermining
and the attrition of capital garrison/decapitation forces.
4.3 Undermining Factor: p,q
1 1p
e and 1 1qe express the effects of
undermining operations against Blue and Red sides.
The idea to generate factors p and q could be
based on the accumulative scales of observable
objective quantities, such as air raid sorties, numbers
of precision bombs or missiles, equivalent SOF
(Special Operation Forces) missions, etc.
Since factor generation is suitable to express
the decreasing marginal effect. From operational
point of view, the targets subject to undermining
operation are prioritised, the targets with high priority
will be neutralised first to cause the most tremendous
damage on the opposing side. But the undermining
operation may not able to eliminate the combat
power of the enemy.
As p(q) approaches infinity, the minimum value of
the exponential function approaches to e–1 0.36788;
as p(q) = 1, the maximum value of the exponential
function = 1, which indicates that no such effect exists.
4.4 Decapitation Combat Status
The second exponential term, 1 1 Dbfe  or 1 1 Drfe ,
aggregates the second effect of decapitation strategy,
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decapitation combat. In general, combat outcomes
could be divided into three categories: mission
accomplishment, spatial effectiveness, and casualty,
among which casualty18 is the most objective and
easy category to be evaluated.
By applying assumption 3, the decapitation combat
status is expressed in the form of surviving fraction
of the force strength. Before the initiation of decapitation
combat, fDb=fDr=1, there is no effect on regular
forces at this time, the exponential terms are = 1;
once the decapitation combat begins, fDb 1 andfDr 1, the terms are < 1. The terms could be equal
to zero mathematically, but the surviving portions
are bounded by breakpoints of garrison/decapitation
forces, that is, the term might be > 0 unless the
forces are eliminated.
5. DISCUSSION
Equation (6) summarises the model building
results for regular combat under decapitation strategy
which integrates the so called Helmbold relationship12
with effects of undermining operation and capital
decapitation combat, and altogether is tuned with
robustness of regular forces. Based on the assumptions,
1 to 4, the presented model satisfies criteria 1 and
2; and is able to interpret hypotheses 1 and 2.
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
Db
Dr
p f C D Gb
b r
q f F G Dr
b r
dA
m e e e A A
dt
dA
n e e e A A
dt
 (6)
It is obvious that when regular forces of both
side have extremely low robustness, m=n=1, a much
more concise form of Eqn (7) is obtained and it
could be easily handled mathematically.
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
Db
Dr
p f C D Gb
b r
q f F G Dr
b r
dA
e e e A A
dt
dA
e e e A A
dt
       
(7)
The effects of undermining and decapitation
combat are time-dependent variables. When various
operations were conducted in separated stages,
capital decapitation combat starts after the completion
of undermining operation and is followed by regular
combat. When this is the case, it is easy to evaluate
the regular combat result, since the decapitation
effect multipliers hold constant during the regular
combat. The overlapping part among these three
types of operations complicates the model and a
numerical example is provided in the next section
to illustrate a discrete time simulation approach to
solve the issue.
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
6.1 Initial Conditions
The total strength of both sides’ ground forces
is equal and is divided evenly in half to commit
capital and regular combat. Both sides have the
capability to launch undermining operations against
each other and the ground combat starts at the end
Undermining 
Operation Ground Combat
Capital Decapitation
Regular Combat
Capital Decapitation
Regular Combat
Gap<0
Gap>0
Undermining 
Operation Ground Combat
Capital Decapitation
Regular Combat
Capital Decapitation
Regular Combat
Gap<0
Gap>0
Capital Combat First (t.Diff<0) Regular Combat Firs (t.Diff>0)
Figure 5. Time difference and combat gap.
ff < 0) Regular bat Firs  (t.Diff > 0)
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of undermining operations. The capital decapitation
and regular combat may be overlapped or in sequence
as shown in Fig. 5.
All ground forces have the same attrition rates,
and both ground battles are fixed-force-level-breakpoint
battle, the victory is determined by the result of
regular combat, that is which side (regular forces)
reaches the breakpoint first loses the war, if both
sides reach the breakpoint at the same time, then
they are in a tie (parity). To provide deep understandings
of the possible outcomes of the war, the Blue
operation planners assume a set of data for assessing,
as shown in Table 3.
With Table 3, the decapitation strategy model
is rewritten in the form of Hartley's  work12 as
Eqn (8).
0.75 0.4
0.75 0.4
0.0302
Decapitation:
0.0302
b
b r
r
r b
dD
D D
dt
dD D D
dt
1 1 1 1 0.75 0.4
1 1 1 1 0.75 0.4
0.0302 1
Regular:
0.0302 1
Dr
Db
q fb
b r
p fr
r b
dA
n ne e A A
dt
dA
m me e A A
dt
                                               
(8)
6.2 Solution Approach
A simple discrete time simulation is adopted
to solve the military problem. Using Eqn (8), the
attrition of capital combat forces is continually
calculated at every fixed time step and the decapitation
effect multipliers are calculated based on the updated
capital forces' levels, then the attrition of regular
force in the time step is obtained by Eqn (8) also.
This approach is suitable to solve situations with
overlapping combats or sequential combats.
SimScript II.5 simulation language is used to
construct simulation program. The functional flowchart
is demonstrated in Fig. 6.
6.3 Simulation Results
A total of 176 options/combinations are simulated
and the results are given in Figs 7 and 8. The line
of RWV (rated winner's value) represents the winner
of the war (the winner of regular combat), when
Blue wins the war, RWV=30; when Red wins the
Main
1. Create Entities (forces)
2. Open Output Files
Initialization
1. Initialize Entities' Attributes
2. Activate Combats at Specified Time
Combat Process
1. Calculate Casualties
2. Calculate Multipliers
3. Modify Entities’ Attributes
Combat
End
Time Step+1
No
Decision Space 
Exhausted
Yes
No
Next Option
Output
Yes
Figure 6. Simulation flow chart.
Table 3. Possible combat data
Category/side Blue Red 
Robustness of regular forces m = 0 or 0.5 n = 0 or 0.5 
Undermine Effect p = 1 or 2 q = 1 or 2 
Force level on capital battlefield Db0 = 0.5 Dr0 = 0.5 
Force level on regular 
battlefield Ab0 = 0.5 Ar0 = 0.5 
Attrition rate capital combat 
forces 
Attrition rate regular forces 
0.0302 
Breakpoint of capital combat 
forces 0.4 
Breakpoint of regular forces 0.6 
Time difference between capital 
and regular combat 25 t.Diff  25 @ 5 
Constants in Eqn (6)12 D = 0.75, G = 0.4 
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war, RWV = –30; RWV = 0 means parity. The line
of t. Gap represents the overlapping time of combats
and it is illustrated in Fig. 5. The term ‘Duration’
means the time span of ground combat (undermining
operation is not taken into account).
Both figures can be divided into four sections
based on (m, n) values; from left to right, these are
(0,0), (0, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5). On each
section of t. Diff, there are 11 segments representing
time differences between capital combat and regular
combat, from –25 to 25 at interval of 5 time units;
every segment contains four sample points representing
(p, q) values: (1,1), (1,2), (2, 1) and (2,2) from left
to right.
Some observations from the results are:
1. When (m, n)=(0, 0) decapitation strategy has no
effect on regular forces and when both sides
are of equal combat power they reach the breakpoint
simultaneously, thus resulting in parity. The same
situation happens in capital decapitation battlefield
which is not shown in figures.
Figure 8. Surviving force level.
Figure 7. Combat results.
459
MENQ, et al.: CONCEPTUAL LANCHESTER-TYPE DECAPITATION WARFARE MODELLING
2. When (m, n)=(0, 0.5), the Red regular forces
has lower robustness and declined combat power
due to decapitation effects, but the Blue regular
forces sustain their combat power, Mb=1. The
Blue regular forces win in most of the cases
except t.Diff 10 and q=1, in such cases, the
results are parity.
From operational point of view, if the decapitation
combat is initiated after the regular combat
has started and the Blue did not launch any
undermining operations against the Red (q=1)
then the Blue may not win the war.
3. The third section, (m, n)=(0.5, 0), shows the
Blue regular forces with lower robustness and
affected by the decapitation effects but the
Red is not. Then the Red will win in most of
the cases except t.Diff 
 
10 and p = 1, in such
cases parity is achieved. That means the Red
should conduct undermining missions to secure
the success of their invasion.
4. It seems that the time difference between
decapitation combat and regular combat has
no influences on the war victory when (m,
n)=(0.5, 0.5), the victory is totally dependant
on the effect of undermining operations. When
p=q parity is achieved; when (p, q)=(1, 2) the
Blue wins, the Red wins when (p, q)=(2, 1).
5. It is observed that –15 t.Diff 0 will yield minimum
ground combat duration of 33 time units in
sections (m, n)=(0, 0), (0, 0.5) and (0.5, 0),  in
section of (0.5, 0.5) only t.Diff=–5 or 0 will
give the same combat duration. This observation
means that if the Red desires a quick victory
then the capital decapitation operation should
be initiated at the right time. To be more precisely,
when (m, n)=(0.5, 0.5), for example, the Red
should commit undermining operation (p=2) and
initiate capital decapitation 5 time units before
regular combat, or at the same time as regular
combat, to win the war in minimum of 33 time
units.
6. Except for victory and combat duration, casualties
is also one of the most concerned factors in
military operation planning. Figure 8 reveals
that the pattern of surviving force level varies
on (m, n) values also.
In the section of (m, n)=(0, 0.5), the Blue
surviving level declines in accordance with
increasing t.Diff but the Red varies within
limited range; in (0.5, 0) section, the situation
is reversed.
The effects of undermining operation, (p, q),
is the other influencing element. In section (0,
0.5), q=2 will produce higher Blue surviving
level than q=1; in section (0.5, 0), p=2 produce
higher Red surviving level than p=1.
The situation in section (0.5, 0.5) is more complex,
the Blue surviving level increase along with
raising t.Diff when (p, q)=(1, 2); the same
thing happens to the Red surviving level when
(p, q)=(2, 1); when p=q the surviving levels
of both sides are equal and do not vary tremendously.
6.5 Example Summary
From the defensive's (Blue) point of view, the
most optimistic situation, (m, n)=(0, 0.5), the defender
should provoke the attacker to start capital decapitation
as early as possible so that the Blue has high
possibility to win the war with low casualties. But
this does not seem a usual case in history.
The most pessimistic result comes from
(m, n)=(0.5, 0), but the result could be parity if the
Blue is able to delay the initiation of offensive
capital decapitation operation concurrently to protect
critical assets from hostile undermining operation
or able to launch undermining operation against
the attacker. It seems that the only way to prolong
duration of combat is to delay the ignition of capital
decapitation combat and this is also the way to
increase the casualties of the Red.
In the fair case, (m, n)=(0.5, 0.5), the dominating
factor is undermining operation. That is, the Blue
will win if the Blue manages to make the Red
suffer higher undermining effects, p<q; or the
Blue might lose the war if p>q.
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7 . CONCLUSION
The design of the Lanchesterian decapitation
warfare model is based on historical observation
which suggests that both undermining factors and
capital decapitation combat have effects on regular
combat. Modelling hypotheses and assumptions are
derived from such observation. In order to apply
the proposed model, a discrete time simulation method
is used to solve the complexity of the model. Through
simulation various options and possibilities could be
explored and the collected data will be helpful to
operation planning.
In the illustrative example only equal force
level is discussed, but any possible total ground
force ratio and force allocation (between capital
and regular battlefield) could be analysed to find
the best force allocation rule.
Beside total force level and force allocation,
the proposed model provides extensive coverage
of decision variables and initial conditions, such as
fixed-force-level or proportional-force-level breakpoints,
attrition rate, time interval between combats, forces'
robustness, and undermining effects. The wide coverage
gives the model flexibility to analyse complex warfare
involving decapitation strategy.
However, to produce precise prediction on the
outcomes of war, further detailed historical study
is required to identify or estimate critical model
parameters such as robustness (m, n) and effects
of undermining operation (p, q).
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